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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the “Declaration”)
by a vote of 143 states in favor and only four states against.1 As one
of the key missions of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous
Populations since its establishment in 1982, the Declaration aims to
make progress towards rectifying the perceived inadequacy of
existing international human rights law.2 Past international human
rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, emphasize the individual but lack language protecting
culturally distinct indigenous communities.3 In response, the drafters
of the Declaration set out to create an international instrument
expressly recognizing a collective right to protection from state
action that could undermine an indigenous group’s ability to remain
a culturally distinct people.4
1. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 *Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration].
2. See, e.g., Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in
Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1173-76 (2008) (seeking to preserve indigenous cultures by
recognizing the necessity for affirmation of self-determination, self-help, and reempowerment of indigenous groups).
3. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (containing no mention of group or
collective rights).
4. See, e.g., Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: A Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV.
539, 539-43 (2009) (lauding the Declaration as signaling the end of the view that
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In its dissent, the United States explained several perceived
problems with the Declaration, including a concern that the
Declaration lacks adequate guidance on the resolution of conflicts
between collective indigenous rights and individual human rights.5
Although non-binding, the Declaration is seen as carrying significant
weight in outlining indigenous collective rights.6 It encourages
nations to look to the principles embodied in the Declaration in
developing their own domestic policies.7 Proponents argue that the
Declaration could come to reflect international customary law as its
principles are injected into domestic judicial rulings and legislative
acts.8 Proactively addressing the conflicts perceived by dissenters
may speed this process and further the goals of indigenous peoples.9
Courts and legislatures seeking to apply the collective rights
embodied in the Declaration will be forced to grapple with the
conflict between individual and collective human rights.10 To explore
issues concerning indigenous peoples are a temporary problem that will eventually
become moot due to natural assimilation).
5. See Robert Hagen, U.S. Advisor, Explanation of Vote on the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 13,
2007), http://www.treatycouncil.org/ PDFs/US_DRIP.pdf (citing flaws in the
Declaration’s treatment of self-determination; land, resources & redress; collective
rights, specifically that, under the fundamental human rights doctrine of universal
applicability, no group of individuals may have rights not afforded to another
group of individuals within the same nation-state; and general welfare).
6. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 551-52 (arguing that formal declarations by
every nation are not necessary to obligate all nations to adhere to human rights
principles adopted by many nations and binding as customary international law).
7. See UN News Center, United Nations Adopts Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=23794&cr=indigenous&cr1=# (urging U.N. member states to integrate
indigenous rights into their policies, even though the Declaration is a non-binding
document); see also Coulter, supra note 4, at 546 (arguing that the Declaration, as
an official statement, carries “political and moral force, creating the basis for it to
become binding customary international law”).
8. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 546 n.43, 551-52 (noting that the Declaration
can be used by a variety of people, including leaders of indigenous people, public
officials, and educators as a tool in domestic advocacy and legislative efforts).
9. Cf. Dwight G. Newman, Theorizing Collective Indigenous Rights, 31 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 273, 280 (2007) (cautioning careful consideration of the concerns
of dissenting nations and encouraging development of an adequate and sound
theoretical response).
10. See id. at 283-84 (offering that, while "probabilistic," conflicting interests
do not logically or necessarily preclude the possibility of compatible individual
and collective rights regimes).
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one of these conflicts, this Comment will focus on the tension
between the individual human right11 to enjoy one’s own culture12
articulated in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights13 (“ICCPR”), and the collective indigenous right to
self-determination and autonomy in internal affairs embodied in
Articles 1 and 4 of the Declaration.14 Part II of this Comment briefly
traces the historical and modern treatment of indigenous peoples
which provide the underlying justification for indigenous rights
instruments, such as the Declaration being necessary and distinct
from individual human rights.15 Part III argues that the Declaration
embodies a flawed rationale found in previous court decisions which
gives greater weight to collective human rights at the expense of
individual human rights. Moreover, host-nation review of indigenous
group membership decisions promotes protection of individual
human rights without undermining indigenous peoples’ right to
internal self-determination.16 Part IV recommends that indigenous
peoples cede partial control of reviewing membership decisions to
the host nation to ensure that individual human rights are respected.17
Part IV further recommends that the Declaration should be amended
to more effectively guide courts in balancing individual human rights

11. See Hagen, supra note 5 (noting that the addition of collective rights to the
existing body of individual human rights begs the question of which should prevail
in a dispute between them).
12. See Johanna Gibson, The UDHR and the Group: Individual and
Community Rights to Culture, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 285, 287 (2008)
(relating the unique indigenous link between access to land and enjoyment of one’s
own culture through the example of Australian aborigines).
13. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR] (expressing minority
communities’ rights in a state to enjoy their distinct culture, practice their religion,
and use their own language).
14. See Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 1, 4 (“Indigenous peoples have the right
to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights . . .”).
15. See discussion infra Part II (linking the history of treatment of indigenous
peoples to the development of collective group rights, and discussing current court
treatment of conflicts between collective and individual rights).
16. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that excessive deference to collective
rights will lead to violations of individual human rights unless there is a just
system for review of membership decisions).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recommending that indigenous groups form
agreements with the host nation to provide for appellate review of tribal
membership decisions by the courts of the host nation).
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and collective rights.18

I. BACKGROUND
It is from a history of injustices that modern activists of
indigenous people’s rights continue to draw caution and strength.19 In
stark contrast to the eras of assimilation and termination, the current
era of indigenous peoples is said to be that of self-determination,
which affords indigenous peoples the right to remain a distinct, often
self-governed group: a longstanding goal of indigenous peoples
groups.20 This Comment briefly traces the background of indigenous
peoples and control of membership decisions, as well as the
Declaration, ICCPR, and court decisions dealing with the conflicting
guidance between the two.21

A. HISTORY OF OPPRESSIVE TREATMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The history of oppressive programs enacted by nations upon
indigenous peoples is undeniable.22 Whether conquered or colonized,
stories of death and displacement are common to indigenous peoples
around the globe.23 The indigenous peoples that survived and were

18. See discussion infra Part IV.B (seeking amendment of the Declaration to
encourage future accession by the dissenting nations by incorporating a balance
between collective and individual rights).
19. See Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. (reiterating in its preamble “that
indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices”).
20. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1534, 49-72, 97-115 (2d ed. 2004) (recounting the history of indigenous peoples’
treatment and the current opportunities for indigenous peoples in international
forums); Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to SelfDetermination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
503, 506-17 (2008) (outlining the history of territoriality and self-determination in
the context of indigenous peoples).
21. See discussion infra Part II.A-F.
22. See generally Rebecca L. Robbins, Self-Determination and Subordination:
The Past, Present, and Future of American Indian Governance, in THE STATE OF
NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 88, 88-107 (M.
Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) (detailing the history of host nation and indigenous
people interaction in North America); Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Peoples and
Postcolonial Colonialism, in RECLAIMING INDIGENOUS VOICE AND VISION 39, 3941 (Marie Battiste ed., 2000) (chronicling the forceful colonization of indigenous
people in the United States, Canada, Africa, and Asia).
23. See Yazzie, supra note 22, at 39-41 (linking advances in warfare and
transportation technology to increased colonization).
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not enslaved or assimilated found it increasingly difficult to hold
onto their lands.24 Through the right of conquest25 and doctrine of
discovery,26 land clearly inhabited by indigenous peoples was
declared uninhabited—a legal fiction known as terra nullius, which
granted title to the conqueror so that the land could be put to more
productive use.27
In Canada and the United States, indigenous peoples were
removed from their ancestral lands,28 occasionally through barter and
treaty,29 seldom equitable in nature, and just as often through force.30
What lands the indigenous peoples did retain were whittled down
over time through programs aimed at terminating reserved lands and
assimilating indigenous peoples into the mainstream.31 Those
indigenous peoples who clung to their traditional ways found

24. See, e.g., THOMAS D. HALL & JAMES V. FENELON, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
GLOBALIZATION: RESISTANCE AND REVITALIZATION 6-11 (2009) (introducing
examples of indigenous resistance to globalization and efforts of indigenous
peoples to preserve traditional culture).
25. See Calvin’s Case, [1608] 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (K.B.) (proclaiming “if a
Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel . . . the laws of the infidel
are abrogated, for that they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of
God and of nature . . .”).
26. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823) (ruling that
the principle of discovery applies, and therefore “the [indigenous] inhabitants are
to be considered merely as occupants . . . deemed incapable of transferring the
absolute title to others”).
27. E.g., Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1153 (noting that an important goal of the
Declaration was delegitimizing the theory of terra nullius, a concept that treated
the original inhabitants of conquered land as legally irrelevant).
28. See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 63-70 (2007) (finding the removal of Native Americans from
their land to be the conceptual predecessor to modern day deportation—the
exercise of a nation's plenary power to exclude foreigners).
29. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian
Treaty Abrogation: “As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”
— How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 608-19 (1975) (detailing the
canons of construction favoring the American Indians that were used to interpret
treaties made between them and the United States, developed in order to inject
some semblance of equality into the agreements).
30. See Yazzie, supra note 22, at 41 (concluding that superior technology
enabled forceful eviction of indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands).
31. See generally HENRY E. FRITZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN
ASSIMILATION, 1860-1890 34-55 (1963) (reviewing arguments in favor of
assimilation as the best alternative to exterminating American Indian culture and
reservations).
AND
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themselves with limited resources and ever-shrinking domains often
far from their traditional haunts.32 Poverty and reliance on
government handouts became the norm for indigenous peoples living
on reservations as modern society continued to develop and encroach
upon them.33

B. MODERN ERA OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The reservation system, which sets aside land for indigenous
peoples, persists as the most common state solution to
accommodating indigenous peoples as distinct cultures.34 One of the
major goals of indigenous peoples across the globe, however, is the
recognition of a collective right to self-determination.35 As
indigenous peoples secure greater representation in both domestic
and international fora, they rightfully demand participation in state
decisions that affect their way of life.36 Though the extent to which
indigenous peoples are successful in this pursuit varies from nation
to nation, the overall trend is moving towards greater respect for the
right of indigenous peoples to exist as a culturally distinct group.37
32. See generally KANSTROOM, supra note 28, at 63-70 (describing removal
era policies and jurisprudence).
33. Cf. Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding
Commercial Prosperity in Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints—Recommendations for
Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 407-11, 423-26
(2008) (blaming federal and state policies for restricting economic growth of
American Indian Nations and requesting recognition of full sovereignty and a
return to treaty making between American Indian nations and the U.S. government
as a remedy).
34. See G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835 705-06
(1988) (asserting that the initial impetus for creation of the reservation system in
the United States was to forcibly separate the American Indians from white society
because of “cultural differentness”).
35. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 543 (praising the Declaration as being a
formal recognition of indigenous peoples’ collective right to exist as a distinct
culture or society).
36. See id. at 553 (urging participation by leaders of indigenous groups in the
political process to garner increased support for recognition by the United States in
international declarations establishing indigenous rights).
37. See S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, Op-Ed., The UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST (Oct. 3,
2007),
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-ofindigenous.php (hailing the Declaration as a milestone that reaffirms the
developing customary law in the indigenous rights field); see also Chidi
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The United States affords a relatively expansive form of
indigenous sovereignty to indigenous tribes. U.S. federal Indian law
is rooted in the principle that tribes, as indigenous peoples, existed as
sovereigns before colonization,38 and therefore retain powers of
sovereignty not expressly abrogated by Congress.39 Though not as
expansive as U.S. domestic policy, other countries also recognize
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.40 For example, in the
Awas Tingni case, South American indigenous peoples successfully
reclaimed title to their ancestral lands by asserting a collective right
to self-determination.41 Integral to the idea of self-determination is
control of internal group affairs, such as determination of
Oguamanam, Indigenous Peoples and International Law: The Making of a Regime,
30 QUEEN’S L.J. 348, 373-87 (2004) (summarizing regional trends and state
practice in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South America,
Japan, Africa, the European Arctic Regions, and the Philippines as reflecting a
positive posture towards indigenous causes).
38. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 206 (Neil
Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322-23 (1978)) (describing Indian tribes as holding “inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished”); Vine Deloria, Jr., SelfDetermination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNTY 118, 123 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996) (extolling the virtues of
increased deference to tribal sovereignty as a remedy for the host nation's artificial
control of community functions).
39. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-63 (1832)
(reinforcing the plenary power of Congress to abrogate any sovereign right of an
Indian nation through litigation); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
13 (1831) (establishing a guardian and ward relationship between the federal
government and tribes); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823)
(accepting the doctrine of discovery for the proposition that all title to lands are
distributed by the conqueror). These three cases establish the principles of
American Indian law and are collectively known as the Marshall trilogy. See
Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV.
691, 698 (2004) (explaining that the “Marshall trilogy” of cases is the first
articulation of Indian Tribes’ position under federal law).
40. See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual
Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law,
34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 189, 219 (2001) (tracing decolonization efforts of
former European colonies to the rise of self-determination as a legal right).
41. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of
the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 51, 62 (2009) (discussing the Awas Tingni community’s struggle with
Nicaraguan authorities which culminated in the Inter-American Court ordering the
Nicaraguan government to demarcate and title ancestral lands back to the Awas
Tingni people).
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membership status, which is most often considered on genealogical
or racial grounds.42

C. BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP GOVERNANCE
An indigenous person is a citizen of the host nation in addition to
his status as an indigenous person.43 Status as a member of a
government-recognized indigenous group can determine legally
whether one is entitled to certain benefits provided by the host
nation.44 Historically, these benefits ranged from the basic right to
live on the reservation, to usufructuary rights extending far beyond
the reservation’s borders.45 Though membership status includes
access to the reservation, there is typically no requirement that a
member live within its borders.46
Financial benefits may also be afforded to indigenous peoples.47 In
Sweden, status as a member of the Sami indigenous people provided
special reindeer breeding rights.48 In the United States, the Indian
42. See Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of Recognition:
Soifer on Law, Pluralism, and Group Identity, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 359, 37186 (1997) (reviewing AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995))
(recognizing Soifer’s view that indigenous identity poses a “significant challenge
to American constitutionalism and liberal ideologies”); see also Kirsty Gover,
Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent
Rules in Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
243, 250-54 (2009) (searching for the legal origins of the tribal preference for
descent rules as a basis for membership).
43. See Eric Reitman, Note, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA.
L. REV. 793, 858-63 (2006) (tracing the federal government’s duty to protect the
rights of tribal members as its wards).
44. See id. at 816-17 (remarking that increased barriers to tribal membership in
the United States may be related to maximizing the tribe’s prosperity and
minimizing payout).
45. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
38, at 1122-23 (discussing the rights, similar to easements, that natives retained
over traditional fishing, hunting, and gathering grounds).
46. See Gover, supra note 42, at 298 (noting many tribal members live offreservation).
47. Cf. Reitman, supra note 43, at 817-18 (cautioning that it would be naive to
discount financial motivations in tribal membership decisions).
48. See 1 § RENNÄRINGSLAGEN [Reindeer Husbandry Act] (Svensk
författningssampling [SFS] 1971:437) (Swed.) (permitting official Sami members
to exercise reindeer breeding rights not available to non-members, whether
ethnically Sami or not).
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Gaming Act paved the way for successful casino operations which
can provide generous income streams to members of the host tribe.49
As these financial benefits grow, so does the import of determining
status as an indigenous person in a just manner.50

D. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS: U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The concept of collective human rights is not universally
accepted.51 Like the United States, other nations object to collective
rights as conflicting with individual human rights.52 Despite the
continuing debate, one of the main goals of the Declaration is to
clearly signal to the international community that internal selfgovernance should be recognized as a collective indigenous right and
left in the control of the indigenous group itself.53 Article 4 of the
Declaration emphasizes and clarifies the right to internal selfdetermination.54 It specifically cites autonomy or internal selfgovernance as necessary rights in order to exercise the right to selfdetermination.55 Internal self-governance encompasses the right to
control enrollment and disenrollment of members.56

49. See Gover, supra note 42, at 298 (explaining that while termination-era
policies created economic hardships for some tribes, gaming and contracting
opportunities provided economic benefits to others).
50. See id. at 244 (crediting the importance of tribal membership criteria to the
deference federal governments give to such determinations and the resultant
federal benefits conferred).
51. See Newman, supra note 9, at 280 (recognizing that the concept of
collective, universal human rights is not unanimously accepted at a conceptual or
moral level).
52. See id. at 278 (including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United
Kingdom among the nations which have gone on record as opposing the idea of
collective rights).
53. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4 (granting indigenous peoples the right
to autonomy or self-government in internal and local matters).
54. See Caroline E. Foster, Articulating Self-determination in the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 141, 150-56
(2001) (characterizing an indigenous group’s exercise of the right to selfdetermination as a form of political participation in interactions with the host
nation).
55. Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4.
56. See id. arts. 4, 33 (finding that in addition to the right to self-governance,
indigenous peoples also have the right to determine identity and membership in
accordance with their own traditional practices).
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Self-determination for indigenous peoples as a group differs from
that of nations or individuals.57 If full self-determination was
afforded to indigenous groups, the logical end result could entail full
independence and secession from the nation within which they
currently reside.58 In fact, progress on the Declaration halted until it
incorporated provisions to expressly disclaim any impact on
territorial sovereignty of the host nation in its adoption of Article
46.59 The form of self-determination adopted in the Declaration is
that of “internal” self-determination. In one description offered by
the Australians, “internal” self-determination is limited to helping
enable indigenous peoples “seeking to assert their identities, to
preserve their languages, cultures, and traditions and to achieve
greater self-management and autonomy, free from undue interference
from central governments.”60 In addition, “internal” selfdetermination is seen as a collective or group right as opposed to an
individual right.61 Deference to an indigenous group’s control of
internal matters and self-determination is construed with a historical
eye towards past treatment.62

57. See generally Castellino, supra note 20, at 505 (analyzing the individual,
group, and national right to self-determination in the context of land rights).
58. See generally EYASSU GAYIM, THE ERITREAN QUESTION: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE INTERESTS OF STATES
191-94 (1993) (associating self-determination with the right to establish an
independent state).
59. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 46 (expressing the adamant rejection of
any interpretation of the Declaration’s provisions which might suggest the right of
any individual or group to violate the U.N. Charter, and also cautioning against
acts which would threaten the territorial integrity of existing nation states).
60. See ANAYA, supra note 20, at 111 (quoting Australian Government
Delegation, Speaking Notes on Self-Determination (July 24, 1991)).
61. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee
under Article 5, Paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Concerning
Communication No. 197/1985, Kitok v. Sweden, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp.
No. 40 (A/43/40) (Mar. 25, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 HRC decision] (upholding an
indigenous group’s decision to deny membership to a former member who had lost
membership status by temporarily abandoning work in the reindeer herding
business).
62. See ANAYA, supra note 20, at 129-31 (finding that host nations must
bolster rights which protect indigenous groups in order to eradicate the legacies of
discrimination and past oppression).
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E. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS
In contrast to the aspirational, non-binding nature of the
Declaration, the ICCPR carries the weight of a treaty.63 Adopted in
1966, Article 27 of the ICCPR applies to ethnic, religious, or
linguistic minorities located within host nations.64 It provides that
those fitting the description must be afforded the right to enjoy their
own culture with the other members of their group.65 Article 27 is
seen as encompassing an individual right of cultural access by
implicitly requiring preservation of the group in order for that culture
to continue to exist.66
The ICCPR is one of several international declarations and
covenants which indigenous peoples have invoked with some
success.67 The drafters of the ICCPR also provided for U.N. Human
Rights Committee (“HRC”) oversight of the provisions through
acceptance of an optional protocol.68 In countries such as Canada and
Sweden, which acceded to the optional protocol, a petitioner may
seek review by the HRC after exhausting domestic remedies.69

63. See ICCPR, supra note 13, arts. 1, 2 (declaring a covenant by the adopting
states to follow the principles espoused within, while conforming with obligations
of the U.N. Charter).
64. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 27.
65. See id. (establishing also the right of minorities, when acting in community,
to their own religion and language).
66. Cf. Gibson, supra note 12, at 315-17 (concluding that individual rights to
culture implicate intellectual property declarations to protect cultural knowledge).
67. See Oguamanam, supra note 37, at 363-67 (listing successful international
indigenous peoples’ laws as emerging from such sources as labor disputes, racial
discrimination, and indigenous activism).
68. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (enabling the HRC to receive and
consider communications from individuals alleging violations of the ICCPR).
69. But see U.N. Human Rights Comm., Lovelace v. Canada, Communication
No. 24/1977, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol, 2d-16th Sess., at 83,
87, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (July 30, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 HRC Decision]
(recognizing that while exhaustion of domestic remedies is usually required before
an individual’s communication is admissible, in this instance, Canadian case law
explicitly set the national Indian Act as controlling the issue).
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F. COURT DECISIONS CONSIDERING MEMBERSHIP GOVERNANCE
In Lovelace v. Canada, brought before the HRC through the
optional protocol, a woman registered as a Maliseet Indian lost her
status as a member of the indigenous community under federal—not
tribal—law by marrying a non-member.70 Denial of membership
based upon marriage to a non-member was limited to women
marrying non-member men per the Canadian Indian Act71 and
purported to reflect a history of patriarchal membership
determinations within the indigenous community.72 Lovelace
asserted among her claims that denial of membership deprived her of
the “cultural benefits of living in an Indian community, the
emotional ties to home, family, friends and neighbours, and the loss
of identity.”73 The HRC noted that this claim fell most directly under
Article 27 of the ICCPR which should protect those who were raised
on a reservation, maintained ties with the reservation community,
and wished to continue to do so.74
The HRC found that while the Canadian Indian Act denied
Lovelace her legal status as an Indian, she remained Indian
ethnically, and by preventing her from living on the reservation as a
right, she was impermissibly denied access to her own culture.75 The
HRC determined that Canada must reasonably and objectively justify
the imposition of statutory restrictions on an indigenous person’s
access to the reservation with which they have ties.76 Finding no
reasonable and objective justification for denying the right to
residence based on Lovelace’s prior marriage to a non-member, the
HRC found that Canada violated the ICCPR.77
70. Id.
71. Indian Act, R.S.C. 2010, c. I-5, § 12(1)(b) (Can.).
72. See 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 84 (recognizing that patrilineal
relationships were utilized in determining the foundation for legal claims).
73. Id. at 85. Petitioner’s claim under a gender discrimination theory was not
addressed because the marriage took place six years before the ICCPR. Id. at 84,
87.
74. See id. at 86 (associating the legal right to reside on the reservation to the
rights of minorities guaranteed by Article 27).
75. See id. at 86 (finding that Lovelace’s several-year absence from the reserve
since the time of her marriage did not remove her from belonging to the minority).
76. See id. at 87 (noting that the restrictions must also be consistent with the
other provisions of the ICCPR).
77. Id. at 87 (holding that the denial of Lovelace’s right to reside on Tobique
Reserve breached Article 27 of the ICCPR, even though she had married and later
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The U.S. Supreme Court addressed indigenous control of
membership in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.78 The petitioner in
this case, a female member of the Santa Clara Pueblo Indian tribe,
sought relief in federal court after her children were denied
membership by the tribe due to her having a non-member husband.79
This was in contrast to the freely admitted membership of children of
men who married non-member women.80 The petitioner argued that
her civil rights, as provided by the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”),
were violated.81 The Supreme Court held that suits against the tribe
under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit and
that Congress did not expressly or implicitly abrogate this sovereign
immunity from suit in passing the ICRA.82 The Court opined that
Congress envisioned resolution of statutory issues under the ICRA as
better addressed in tribal forums more familiar with tribal tradition
and custom.83 In effect, the Court sanctioned a clearly discriminatory
policy, one that would have probably been struck down had the rule
been that of a state rather than an indigenous group.84 Academics
have postulated that even if the United States previously acceded to
the optional protocol, the HRC would have upheld the deference to
membership rules enforced by the indigenous group itself.85
divorced a non-member).
78. 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978) (examining an Indian tribe’s ordinance that
regulated tribe membership for certain female tribal members’ children).
79. See id. at 51-52 (submitting that the children’s membership was denied,
even though the children were raised on, and as adults, continued to live on the
reservation).
80. Id. at 51.
81. See id. (asserting a violation of Title I of the Act, which restricts the denial
of equal protection of law by tribal rule on the basis of both sex and ancestry).
82. Id. at 59.
83. Id. (recognizing Congress’ desire for little intrusion into the tribes’ selfgovernment, as well as the knowledge of traditions and customs that tribal fora
possess that federal courts lack).
84. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979) (invalidating a similar
state law basing parental rights on the gender of the parent due to it not being
“substantially related to an important state interest”). See also Kingsbury, supra
note 40, at 211-16 (comparing Santa Clara and Kitok to other cases invoking the
Optional Protocol).
85. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 1018-19 (5th ed. 2005) (claiming that the HRC, in its decisions in
Kitok and Lovelace, expressly limited the application of ICCPR Article 27 to
decisions to deny membership made by a national as opposed to tribal
government).
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The HRC again dealt with Article 27 in Kitok v. Sweden where an
ethnic Sami individual was denied special reindeer breeding rights
afforded to the indigenous group.86 Mr. Kitok lost this breeding right
under a 1971 Swedish statute; providing that once a Sami engages in
any other profession for a period of three years, he loses his status as
a Sami herder and cannot re-assert those rights except with special
permission.87 In the Swedish system, indigenous groups decide
membership status first, but the decision may be appealed to the
national judicial system if special circumstances are found.88
Although both parties agreed that securing reindeer breeding rights is
an integral part of Sami culture, it was the financial interest of the
group to limit the number of Sami who can exercise the reindeer
rights that led to Kitok’s denial of recognition.89 Sweden argued that
exercise of one’s Article 27 rights are justified in a democratic
society when necessary to further important public interests or
protect the rights and freedoms of the people.90 The HRC added a
State requirement that restrictions on individual membership
decisions be reasonable and objective, as well as necessary to ensure
the continued existence of the minority as a community.91 The HRC
ultimately agreed with Sweden’s exercise of restraint in declining to
grant Kitok member status and therefore Sweden did not violate
Article 27. The HRC noted however that Kitok was still permitted to
86. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 221-22 (considering whether
Sweden denied Kitok the right to enjoy his indigenous culture and therefore
violated Article 27).
[Reindeer
Husbandry
Act]
(Svensk
87. RENNÄRINGSLAGEN
författningssampling [SFS] 1971:437) (Swed.); see also 1987 HRC Decision,
supra note 61, at 222 (stating that the Swedish Crown and the Lap bailiff instituted
the statute in an effort to reduce the number of reindeer breeders).
88. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 229 (acknowledging that while
the initial conflict was between a Sami individual and the Sami community, the
existence of the Reindeer Husbandry Act, which permits an appeal to Swedish
courts in the event the Sami refused an individual membership, constituted state
action and triggered the responsibility of the state).
89. See id. at 229 (noting that regulating economic activity is generally an
exclusive matter for the state, except when such activity is an “essential element”
of an indigenous culture that wishes to protect its lifestyle).
90. See id. at 225 (arguing that the goal of the Reindeer Husbandry Act was to
protect and preserve Sami culture, and that any restrictions on an individual’s
exercise of rights should be weighed against this strong public interest).
91. See id. at 230 (noting the conflict between the purpose of the legislation—
to protect the rights of the Sami as a group—and the application of the legislation
to a single member of that group).
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engage in the reindeer business, just not as a right.92

II. ANALYSIS
The Declaration adds to human rights literature that is already
crowded with several declarations and covenants.93 It endorses the
analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara which is overly
deferential to the tribe in membership decisions.94 By doing so, the
Declaration fails to offer a balanced approach to the resolution of
conflicts between collective and individual human rights that arise in
membership governance disputes.95 To ensure respect of individual
human rights, host-nation review of indigenous membership
decisions facilitates the nation ultimately responsible to international
law obligations taking an active role in the membership decisions.96
A negotiated agreement between the host nation and the indigenous
group, balancing individual rights against collective rights, would not
unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination.97 This
Comment discusses each of these issues in turn.

92. Id.
93. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 292-99 (including, but not limited to, the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities) Additionally, the established
international literature on human rights pertains to the protection of individuals,
minorities, and intellectual property as relevant to the right to culture. See id.
94. See discussion infra Part III.A (asserting that the balancing approach of
Kitok is fairer and preferable to the highly deferential approach of Santa Clara
because it accounts for both the collective right of self-determination and the
individual right to enjoy one’s own culture).
95. See id. (arguing that deference to collective rights is excessive when
inquiries into membership governance are analyzed in terms of the collective right
to self-determination without giving proper weight to the individual right to enjoy
one’s own culture).
96. See discussion infra Part III.B (contending that the host nation’s court
systems, which could provide a neutral forum to help ensure that a reasonable and
objective justification was provided in cases of membership denial, should
consistently be held as the nation’s final arbiter before a claim of violation of
Declaration rights could proceed to international review).
97. See id. (claiming that the same rationale for the Declaration provisions that
expressly limit the concept of self-determination to preclude secession from the
host nation, support host-nation review of membership decisions).
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A. THE DECLARATION FAILS TO OFFER AN APPROPRIATELY
BALANCED APPROACH TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN
COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ARISE IN
MEMBERSHIP GOVERNANCE DISPUTES.

In failing to offer guidance on how to balance rights afforded
indigenous peoples as a collective, and indigenous peoples as
individuals, the Declaration endorses the U.S. Supreme Court’s
deferential analysis in Santa Clara rather than the more appropriate
balancing analysis set out by the HRC in Lovelace and Kitok.
Whether nominally binding as a treaty, or only aspirational in nature,
the Declaration purports to represent principles applicable across
national boundaries, with the implicit goal of recognition and
enforceability as customary international law.98 The Declaration
unabashedly attempts to strengthen indigenous peoples’ right to selfdetermination as a collective human right.99 In linking internal selfgovernance to self-determination, proponents of the Declaration
frame control of membership decisions as a key collective right.100
Deference to collective rights is excessive when an analysis entails
inquiries into membership governance in terms of the collective right
to self-determination without giving proper weight to the individual
right to enjoy one’s own culture.101 As a standard to be pursued, the
Declaration’s failure to appropriately balance collective and
individual human rights could undermine its aspirational goals.102
The Declaration encourages analysis of membership governance
disputes in terms of collective self-determination rather than in terms

98. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 552 (characterizing the Declaration as a
statement by the countries who support it that collective indigenous rights exist in
customary international law, and must be respected with or without formal
adoption).
99. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1 (specifying a collective right to
enjoyment of international human rights law).
100. See id. art. 4 (declaring the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy in
internal affairs).
101. See Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 248-50 (arguing that the current flexibility
allowed in choosing a theory upon which to resolve individual versus collective
rights allows evasion and abuse, and runs the risk of delegitimizing indigenous
claims by polarizing political forces against them).
102. But see Declaration, supra note 1, pmbl. (characterizing the Declaration as
embodying a standard of achievement to be sought by the international
community).
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of individual rights.103 In Santa Clara, the U.S. Supreme Court
analyzed a membership dispute in terms of the impact on the tribe’s
right to self-determination while discounting that its decision would
deny a domestic forum to review the petitioner’s gender
discrimination and community access claim.104 While recognizing
that Congress, through the ICRA, codified an extension of individual
civil and human rights to tribal members, the Court rationalized that
providing a federal forum for review of the enforcement of those
rights would undermine the tribe’s collective right to selfdetermination to an impermissible degree.105 The Court further
opined in Santa Clara that tribal courts are better equipped than
federal courts to rule on membership decisions.106 A fair
interpretation of the Santa Clara holding concedes that a tribal court
possesses the best knowledge and expertise to determine the impact
on the collective of granting membership status to an individual
petitioner.107 On the other hand, the impact the indigenous group
considers may be of a financial or political measure, rather than
based on the impact a grant of membership status may bear on the
collective cultural identity.108
The Declaration fails to provide a standard on which to judge the

103. See, e.g., Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 190, 247 (differentiating five
conceptual structures for indigenous peoples claims including 1) human rights and
non-discrimination claims, under which the petitioner in Santa Clara may have
prevailed, and 2) self-determination claims, under which the Court decided Santa
Clara and embodied in the Declaration Article 4).
104. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (reasoning that
Congress deliberately passed the Indian Civil Rights Act without an explicit
provision providing for federal review of tribal enforcement of the statute).
105. See id. at 64 (finding that federal review of tribal membership decisions
would contradict the legislative purpose of ICRA to protect tribal self-government
by undermining tribal authority and imposing serious financial burdens on tribes
defending federal lawsuits).
106. See id. at 65, 71 (reasoning that civil disputes arising under Section 1302 of
ICRA often turn on issues involving tribal customs and traditions, which tribal
forums may be best suited to address).
107. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 822-23 (relating the holding of courts that
have relied on Santa Clara interpreting it to mean that internal tribal affairs, such
as membership decisions, are not the appropriate subjects for federal courts, only
tribal courts).
108. See id. at 801-03 (noting ways in which gaming tribes may abuse control of
membership decisions, including disenfranchisement, disenrollment, and
banishment).
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equities of indigenous group membership decisions.109 Without a
standard, the indigenous group may continue to arbitrarily disregard
individual rights.110 In Lovelace, where the state—and not the
indigenous group—made the membership determination, the HRC
determined that the petitioner’s membership could not be denied
without a reasonable and objective justification.111 The Declaration,
through its emphasis on collective rights, supports the proposition
that protection of internal self-governance should end the inquiry
into whether a reasonable and objective justification exists in
disputed membership decisions.112
A more balanced approach is required in order to ensure that rights
guaranteed to individuals, by international instruments such as the
ICCPR, are not violated in membership decisions left entirely under
the control of indigenous groups.113 Without a more balanced
approach, indigenous groups retain free reign to make arbitrary
decisions which violate anti-discrimination and other human rights
laws.114

109. See Hagen, supra note 5 (justifying voting against the Declaration because
the text was prepared through a flawed process and is both confusing and open to
conflicting interpretation).
110. Cf. Klint A. Cowan, International Responsibility for Human Rights
Violations by American Indian Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 42 (2006)
(asserting that “[t]ribal violations of U.S. international human rights obligations are
attributable to the United States because the tribes . . . fall under the rubric of State
organs[,]” and thus trigger the responsibility of the state).
111. 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 87 (finding that while restrictions on
indigenous rights must be reasonable and objective, Article 27 must also be
applied in light of other relevant Declaration provisions).
112. See Coulter, supra note 4, at 543 (commenting that the Declaration
represents a formal recognition by the international community of the right of
indigenous peoples to exist and their right to self-governance).
113. See Oguamanam, supra note 37, at 398 (concluding that support for
indigenous people’s rights as customary law is premised on moral as well as legal
theories, and that states must continue to protect the binding obligations
comprising existing human rights law). But see, Newman, supra note 9, at 285
(postulating that the relationship between individual and collective rights are
internally bonded because groups with collective rights ultimately serve their
individual members; thus, conflict between the two rights should be a rare
occurrence).
114. See Tina Kempin Reuter, Dealing with Claims of Ethnic Minorities in
International Law, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 201, 213 (2009) (recognizing the tension
created by empowering ethnic minorities over other minorities or individuals, but
finding that practical goals of peace and stability favor such an approach).
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Though the Declaration represents a standard for a nation’s
treatment of indigenous group rights, it also invites nations to allow
indigenous groups to make membership decisions without hostnation review by granting the indigenous group the right to selfdetermination.115 When viewing membership decisions solely in
terms of preserving self-determination for the collective, the
balancing seen in Kitok may not occur.116 The HRC considered and
weighed the petitioner’s individual right and deemed such a denial as
reasonably and objectively necessary for the viability of the
collective as a whole.117 By considering the petitioner’s individual
human rights, the HRC recognized the inadequacy of analyzing
membership governance disputes solely in terms of internal selfgovernance and collective self-determination.118 Though ultimately
decided against the petitioner under the deferential analysis of Santa
Clara and the Declaration, the entire inquiry may have ended once
internal self-governance was implicated.119
Vigorous enforcement of collective rights without respect to
individual rights runs the risk of fostering resentment by nonmembers towards indigenous groups and thereby undermining the
goals of the Declaration.120 The rationale for the adoption of
115. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 4 (“Indigenous peoples . . . have the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local
affairs . . .”); Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1174 (including local and internal selfgovernment as essential to providing an appropriate legal framework within which
indigenous peoples rights are respected).
116. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (employing a balancing
approach to resolve the apparent conflict between the legislation, which protects
the minority as a whole and the application of that legislation, which can adversely
affect individual members of that minority).
117. Id. (holding that the restriction of Mr. Kitok’s reindeer herding rights were
not disproportionate to the legitimate goals of the legislation to protect the welfare
of the whole Sami community).
118. See id. (eschewing resolving the conflict between collective and individual
rights solely in terms of collective rights).
119. Compare Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978) (finding
that federal review of tribal membership decisions would clearly undermine tribal
self-government and would also fail to address petitioner’s individual rights), with
1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (discussing the implications of the
legislation protecting Sami breeding rights on the petitioner’s individual rights,
despite the potential encroachment on tribal self-government decisions).
120. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 287 (recounting the moral controversy
inspired by conflict between U.S. federal child protection laws and tribal control of
children born within the tribe).
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collective rights was that individual rights were not sufficient to
protect indigenous groups from assimilative pressures.121 Once
collective rights are perceived as granting more than is arguably
necessary, the nation granting those rights may come under criticism
for uneven enforcement of individual human rights.122
As indigenous peoples travel along the path of self-determination
and experience more success and prosperity, the special protections
and benefits they enjoy will become increasingly desirable to those
with a plausible claim to membership.123 Despite a present dearth of
examples of membership disputes being litigated, disputes may
become more commonplace in the near future, as seen in the United
States with the rise of potential casino-derived income and increases
in disenrollment rates.124 A balanced approach to weighing individual
rights against the collective right will help ensure that the principles
of the Declaration can live up to the aspirational standard it purports
to represent.125

B. HOST-NATION REVIEW OF INDIGENOUS MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS
HELPS ENSURE INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS ARE RESPECTED
AND DOES NOT UNNECESSARILY UNDERMINE THE GOALS OF SELFDETERMINATION.

Kitok, Lovelace, and Santa Clara each offer insight into how
courts resolve indigenous group membership disputes.126 All three
121. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of
International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L. L. 369, 371 (stating that the partial basis for
the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations was the notion that existing
human rights were either inadequate or not fully applied).
122. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 849-50 (describing the dual economic
benefit that comes with tribal membership: income derived from the tribe itself and
income derived from federal subsidies granted to tribes).
123. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 110, at 27-30 (leaving control of access to
tribal membership to the tribes themselves does not provide an adequate
substantive remedy to individuals affected by membership denial decisions).
124. See Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 136 (2007) (noting the obvious
correlation between tribal economic success and desirability of tribal membership).
125. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 9, at 288 (theorizing that “points of
reconciliation” between individual and collective moral rights will prove that
implementation of collective legal rights can alleviate concern about the potentially
adverse affect that the growth of collective human rights law will have on
individual rights).
126. See discussion supra Part II.F (discussing court decisions considering
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cases exhibit deference to collective rights, which the Declaration
encourages; however, each differs with respect to the level of
deference and the system of review over such membership
decisions.127 The three decisions are the subject of considerable
discussion among indigenous rights commentators,128 but in order to
ensure that individual human rights are not sacrificed in the name of
collective self-determination, a state forum competent to review
indigenous membership decisions is required, as seen in Kitok and
Lovelace.129
Kitok stands apart in describing a system that maintains deference
to indigenous group rights to self-determination while ensuring that
individual human rights are respected through host-nation review.130
In Lovelace, a government gender-based rule impermissibly denied a
woman access to her culture.131 Similarly, in Santa Clara a rule
enforced by an indigenous sovereign was found to be unreviewable
by the government.132 However, in contrast, Kitok presents a
government rule based on financial interests of the indigenous group,
reviewable by the group in the first instance, and appealable to the
government.133
While it would be a step backwards for indigenous rights
proponents to encourage full host-nation government creation and
control of membership criteria, host-nation review of indigenous
indigenous group membership disputes).
127. See discussion supra Part II.F (finding that Santa Clara demonstrates total
deference to indigenous control while Kitok and Lovelace exhibit national systems
that provide for host-nation control or review of such decisions).
128. See Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 207-16 (discussing Kitok, Lovelace, and
Santa Clara as indicative of some of the misgivings of indigenous groups
regarding Article 27 of the Declaration).
129. See discussion infra Part III.B (arguing that host-nation review of
indigenous membership decisions helps ensure individual human rights are
respected and does not unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination).
130. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 230 (expressing concern for the
rights of the individual petitioner and employing a balancing test to ensure that the
restriction upon the petitioner’s rights was both reasonably and objectively
justified, and was necessary for the welfare of the minority as a whole).
131. See discussion, supra Part II.F (discussing the Lovelace case in which a
woman was denied membership due to her previous marriage to a non-member).
132. See discussion, supra Part II.F (discussing the Santa Clara case where a
woman’s children were denied membership by the tribal group because their father
was a non-member).
133. See discussion, supra Part II.F.
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group-created membership criteria would not undermine the goals of
self-determination.134 The petitioner in all three cases was denied
access to their own culture, but it appears that only when the
government creates, as in Lovelace, or is able to review the
membership rule, as in Kitok, that consideration of individual human
rights occurs.135 In Santa Clara, the host nation entrusted the
balancing of rights to the indigenous group itself, but in doing so also
removed a forum for review of such decisions.136 Just as indigenous
groups increasingly turn to international courts to provide objective
review of disputes between themselves and their host nation,137 in
cases of membership denial an individual should be able to seek
review of indigenous group membership decisions in a neutral forum
provided by the host nation to help ensure that a reasonable and
objective justification is provided.138
In order to preserve individual human rights, those adversely
affected by an indigenous group membership decision should be able
to appeal to the government of the host nation.139 Recognition that
host-nation integrity is superior to the indigenous collective right of
134. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 862-63 (arguing that review of indigenous
group membership decisions is the host nation’s affirmative duty in order to
protect indigenous groups).
135. See, e.g., Christina L. Brandt-Young, Multicultural Jurisdictions at the
National and International Levels, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 241, 242-56 (2002)
(reviewing AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001)) (employing Lovelace and Kitok to
discuss the author’s proposed solutions to the tension caused by encounters
between women’s rights movements and inflexible traditional culture protected by
indigenous group rights).
136. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 73 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (taking issue with the majority failing to provide a federal forum for
vindication of a federally granted right).
137. See, e.g., Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1152-55 (documenting the change
within international law by recognizing the rights of indigenous groups and
granting indigenous groups means for protecting those rights).
138. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 43, at 863 (noting the absurdity of either
extreme of severely restricting a tribe’s authority to determine citizenship or
granting a tribe unfettered membership power to point out that federal review of
membership decisions should be required).
139. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 124, at 89-91 (2007) (recommending federal
review of tribal banishment decisions based on comity of nations and exhaustion of
tribal remedies, and arguing that such review achieves the important tribal
objectives of preserving traditional tribal values and practices while upholding
tribal self-government).
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self-determination is already incorporated in the Declaration’s
provisions to expressly disclaim any impact on territorial sovereignty
as a concession to the African nations.140 Though objectively these
provisions expressly limit the concept of self-determination in order
to preclude secession from the host nation, the same rationale
supports host-nation review of membership decisions.141 In that
respect, the host nation and its court systems would consistently be
held as the nation’s final arbiter before proceeding to international
review.142 Otherwise, one would think that logically a membership
dispute by an individual would go from indigenous group straight to
an international forum, bypassing the host nation and undermining its
authority and territorial integrity.143 Providing for host-nation review
does not undermine indigenous group control of internal selfgovernance any more than disclaimers providing that regardless of
the actions of the host nation, the indigenous group will not secede
from the nation.144
This review process will not impact the indigenous group’s right
to self-determination as long as sufficient deference is given to the
indigenous group’s decisions.145 Deference is a concept well
140. See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1160 (indicating that the incorporation of
Article 45 of the Declaration was an attempt to quell the African nations’ fears that
borders imposed since colonial times could be re-opened for dispute, absent
language limiting the concept of indigenous self-determination in Article 3).
141. See, e.g., Kunesh, supra note 124, at 138 (noting that tribal courts, similar
to other foreign nations granted comity by US courts, must guarantee basic due
process rights to members).
142. See, e.g., id. at 143-44 (concluding that the comity-exhaustion device
sufficiently addresses the interests at stake—tribal sovereignty, culture, and selfgovernment as well as individual ICRA and due process rights—in allowing the
national government to be the final arbiter of tribal membership disputes).
143. Cf. Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1160-61 (describing the fear held by African
nations that pursuing self-determination to its logical end could create threats to
existing territorial integrity).
144. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 46 (seeking recognition of selfdetermination for indigenous groups while prohibiting actions which may
undermine "political unity" of the host nation). But see Newman, supra note 9, at
279 (forecasting that Anaya's theory will likely not assuage critics of collective
rights by simply saying that collective rights do not threaten previously existing
individual human rights because balancing of competing rights has always
occurred).
145. See, e.g., Reuter, supra note 114, at 229 (finding the recognition of limited
autonomy for indigenous groups to be desirable and consistent with recent trends
in minority rights, as the lack of such limits could lead to ethnic conflicts and grave

2011]

COLLECTIVE V. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

509

articulated by courts in many contexts ranging from the deference
appeals courts give to trial judges in decisions pertaining to admitting
evidence,146 to the deference given by the HRC and the Swedish
court system to the Sami indigenous group in its decision not to reenroll Kitok.147 Oversight and reasonable limitations on indigenous
group control of membership decisions will help avoid the potential
for abuse of generally accepted individual rights of access to culture
in the name of preserving the collective identity of the group.148
The overarching goal of the Declaration is respect for an
indigenous group’s right to exist as a distinct, self-governing
community with the right to fully participate in host-nation decisions
affecting its way of life.149 As the indigenous community seeks
assurances that the host nation fairly grants access to the political
process which affects their group, the individual with ethnic ties to
such a community is justified in seeking assurance that the group
fairly grants access to the political process which affects their
membership status.150 As the indigenous community turns to the
international courts to occasionally review disputes between the
community and the host nation,151 the individual should in turn be
human rights violations such as genocide).
146. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984) (citing the Federal Rules
of Evidence as requiring that an appellate court afford the trial court “wide
discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence”).
147. See 1987 HRC Decision, supra note 61, at 223, 230 (discussing the
Reindeer Act’s deference to Sami membership decisions, and ultimately holding
that the Act did not violate the ICCPR’s guarantee that an individual may enjoy his
or her own culture).
148. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 863 (defining the roles of federally
recognized tribes as sovereign political entities to which the federal government
owes a duty of protection; thereby concluding that tribal abuses of membership
decisions, which could undermine their own continued existence, must be
actionable by the federal government).
149. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 143-44 (proposing federal review of tribal
banishment decisions based on principles of fairness and deference to tribal
traditions as the best solution for tribal abuse of plenary power of membership
decisions).
150. See id. at 131-33 (providing an example showing that sometimes internal
conflicts regarding the direction of the tribe have resulted in banishments as a form
of political reprisal, seriously undermining individual human rights and freedom of
participation in the tribe’s political process).
151. See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 1152-54 (summarizing the past half century
of increased active participation by proponents of indigenous rights on the
international stage).
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able to turn to the host nation to occasionally review disputes
between the individual and the community.152

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INDIGENOUS GROUPS SHOULD CEDE SOME CONTROL OF
INDIGENOUS GROUP MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS TO THE HOST NATION.

While the history of treatment of indigenous peoples justifies
zealous defense of any perceived abrogation of indigenous peoples’
rights,153 advocates should not lose sight of a rational basis to justify
collective rights as necessarily separate from individual human
rights.154 The original international human rights instruments aspired
to craft universal human rights that would protect all individuals
from discrimination and oppression irrespective of their group
memberships.155 With the Declaration, advocates of indigenous
peoples’ rights created an instrument that protects groups from
discrimination and oppression.156 Human rights issues of the
individual and collective are receiving ever increasing attention both
domestically and internationally.157
As host nations are ultimately responsible to all their respective
citizens for individual human rights, they should ensure that
collective rights infringe on individual rights only when required by

152. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 137 (advocating the use of the principles of
comity to ensure proper respect of foreign sovereign judgments while balancing
the interests of each nation).
153. See generally EagleWoman, supra note 33, at 388-406 (reinforcing the
point that despite advances in tribal rights throughout history, European and U.S.
policy undermined tribal economic development by not fully embracing tribal
sovereignty).
154. See generally Kingsbury, supra note 40, at 244-45 (calling attention to the
issues that arise from adding indigenous group claims as a new conceptually
distinct category in a field already occupied with other minority and gender rights).
155. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 294 (noting that minority rights were
deliberately omitted from the UDHR because rights to culture were thought to be
achievable through universal individual human rights).
156. See Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 37 (claiming the Declaration offers
legal protections from state action, such as genocide and forced assimilation,
aimed at diminishing an indigenous group’s integrity as a distinct group).
157. See Reuter, supra note 114, at 236 (finding that the international
community failed in the creation of a unified legal approach with standardized
guidelines to resolving the increasing claims of ethnic groups in international law).
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a reasonable and objective justification.158 As recognized in
Lovelace, having access to one’s ethnic community is enshrined in
Article 27 of the ICCPR as a fundamental human right.159 When
indigenous groups are afforded special rights or privileges such as
land use and protections, they take on an additional responsibility to
not deny the privileges that flow from membership absent sufficient
cause.160 The nation which allows the indigenous group to retain and
sometimes grant these privileges also has an interest in overseeing
membership governance.161
In light of growing international recognition of indigenous peoples
and their unique circumstances, indigenous groups should encourage
host nation participation by allowing judicial review of decisions,
such as in Kitok.162 This may be accomplished through laws enacted
by the host nation being drafted with the participation of the
indigenous groups.163 Although indigenous sovereignty and selfdetermination should be fiercely guarded against encroachment by
arbitrary national laws, absolute deference to indigenous sovereigns
opens the host nation up to criticism on individual human rights
grounds.164 However, as long as proper deference is given to
158. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 43, at 796 (contrasting the legal obstacles a
host nation faces when attempting to forcibly revoke a person’s citizenship with
the ease with which indigenous communities may banish one of its members).
159. See 1981 HRC Decision, supra note 69, at 87 (recognizing that a state’s
restrictions on the right to residence, when it unreasonably interferes with the right
of access to one’s native culture, constitutes a breach of the right to enjoy one’s
culture); see also ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 27 (stating that “persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture”).
160. See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 110, at 1 (noting that when indigenous peoples
take on governmental powers, their host government can potentially be responsible
for the indigenous groups' human rights violations).
161. See, e.g., id. at 42 (proposing that “[t]ribal violations of U.S. international
human rights obligations are attributable to the United States because the tribes . . .
fall under the rubric of State organs”).
162. See Kunesh, supra note 124, at 145 (arguing that the uncertainty and
unfairness surrounding the existence and protection of individual human rights
within membership decisions by tribes leads to fear, distrust, and contempt).
163. See Reitman, supra note 43, at 848-50 (noting that because all indigenous
peoples are also citizens of their host nation, subjecting membership decisions to
judicial review by the host nation is already within the host nation’s authority).
164. See Cowan, supra note 110, at 43 (concluding that because it is possible for
the United States to be held accountable for tribes’ human rights violations, tribal
governments should take measures to incorporate human rights protections to
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indigenous group membership decisions, host-nation review will not
unnecessarily undermine the group’s right to self-determination.

B. THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO CLEARLY REFLECT
INDIGENOUS CONTROL COUPLED WITH HOST-NATION REVIEW OF
TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP DECISIONS.
The Declaration advocates self-determination of internal matters
without providing for host-nation review.165 The failure to address
dissenters’ concerns regarding the balancing of individual and group
human rights resulted in four of the largest indigenously populated
nations voting against the Declaration’s adoption and profusely
disclaiming any legal effect on the state of the law of indigenous
peoples.166 Since the Declaration was amended to accommodate the
African states’ concerns that indigenous groups could use the
Declaration as a platform from which to justify secession from the
nation state, the Declaration should be further amended to reflect the
HRC’s decisions in Kitok and Lovelace, which support deference for
tribal membership decisions made initially by the indigenous group
coupled with the opportunity for host–nation review.167 Such
assurances would reign in critiques that the Declaration is overly
expansive and would also help alleviate the dissenters’ concern that
the Declaration’s version of self-determination goes too far and
encourages political independence from the host nation.168
Santa Clara is the most deferential policy regarding host-nation
protect their sovereignty from “more intrusive federal restrictions and oversight”).
165. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that by linking internal selfgovernance to self-determination, which established control over membership
decisions as a key collective right without also providing for a meaningful review
for those decisions, the Declaration failed to appropriately balance collective rights
with individual rights).
166. See Hagen, supra note 5 (expressing the rejection by the United States of
any possibility that the Declaration, as an aspirational document, is or could ever
become binding as customary international law).
167. See discussion supra Part III.B (arguing that host-nation review of
indigenous membership decisions helps ensure that individual human rights are
respected and does not unnecessarily undermine the goals of self-determination).
168. See, e.g., Pasqualucci, supra note 41, at 51-54 (reporting that while the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights largely conforms to the Declaration’s
principles, the Court diverges from the Declaration’s expansive proclamations of
indigenous rights in relation to a State’s appropriation of natural resources on
indigenous lands).
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non-interference with indigenous group membership decisions
because it leaves individuals without a remedy under the courts of
the government which granted the rights.169 Though celebrated by
domestic Indian law scholars, the policy opens the United States to
criticism internationally as the balance between collective and
individual human rights becomes customary international law.170 As
parties to international human rights instruments, host nations are
responsible to ensure that their individual citizens are able to exercise
their rights.171 Since indigenous members are also citizens of the host
nation, they should be able to appeal adverse membership decisions
to the host nation’s courts pursuant to self-determination rights, as
well as individual human rights, in order to better shape the evolution
of the law.172

CONCLUSION
Indigenous peoples must proactively address issues raised by
powerful host nations. Given the history of oppression which only in
recent decades gave way to an era of self-determination, indigenous
peoples should take care not to let the pendulum swing too far in
their favor. When host nations grant indigenous peoples special
rights and privileges, non-member citizens will increasingly take
notice of who is afforded those benefits. The Declaration, although it
already recognizes the importance of indigenous control of
169. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 83 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“And once it has been decided that an individual does possess certain
rights vis-à-vis his government, it necessarily follows that he has some way to
enforce those rights.”).
170. See, e.g., Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal
Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 1756-60 (2003) (asserting that indigenous
groups’ right to cultural integrity is a powerful example of the interaction between
general customary international law and other legal norms which result in a legal
norm being accorded the status of customary international law).
171. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 12, at 285-89 (arguing that the host nation is
obligated to maintain and protect the indigenous community’s cultural knowledge
in order to maintain the ability of the individual to enjoy participation and access to
that community knowledge).
172. See, e.g., John D. Smelcer, Comment, Using International Law More
Effectively to Secure and Advance Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Towards
Enforcement in U.S. and Australian Domestic Courts, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
301, 305-06 (2006) (encouraging the use of international instruments as persuasive
authority in domestic courts in order to speed the process of such international
instruments developing into customary international law).
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membership decisions, should be amended to take into account
individual human rights found in the ICCPR and other individual
human rights instruments. In host nations where indigenous groups
are afforded special rights, leaving ultimate review of membership
decisions under the purview of the host nation helps immunize
indigenous groups from potential criticism. It is vital to the continued
success of indigenous groups to gain the support of powerful nations
such as the United States, and advocate for a system which respects
both collective and individual rights, even when the current doctrine
goes too far in deferring to the indigenous group.

